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ABSTRACT This article presents a model of sequential decisions about investments in environmentally
dirty and clean technologies, which extends the path-dependence framework of B. Arthur (1989, Competing
technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events, The Economic Journal, 99, pp. 116–131).
This allows us to evaluate if and how an economy locked into a dirty technology can be unlocked and move
towards clean technology. The main extension involves the inclusion of the effect of recombinant innovation of
the two technologies. A mechanism of endogenous competition is described involving a positive externality of
increasing returns to investment which are counterbalanced by recombinant innovation. We determine
conditions under which lock-in can be avoided or escaped. A second extension is “symmetry breaking” of the
system due to the introduction of an environmental policy that charges a price for polluting. A final extension
adds a cost of environmental policy in the form of lower returns on investment implemented through a growth-
depressing factor. We compare cumulative pollution under different scenarios, so that we can evaluate the
combination of environmental regulation and recombinant innovation.
KEY WORDS: Externalities, hybrid technology, lock-in, R&D, sequential decisions
1. Introduction
Various studies have modelled competition between two or more distinct technologies to
study adoption or investment in research and development (R&D) (Dosi, 1982; Arthur, 1989;
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David and Foray, 1994). Here we extend this literature in two ways to address environmental
problems. First, we add the pollution intensities of competing technologies and introduce an
environmental policy that taxes pollution. Second, we allow for diversified technological
choices that stimulate the emergence of hybrid technological solutions. Our motivation is
that in many, if not most, cases a new technology is the result of recombining two or more
existing technologies in a modular way. The expectation of fruitful recombinant innovations
may therefore drive decisions about R&D investment in the existing technologies (van den
Bergh, 2008). We propose recombinant innovation as a force that counterbalances the
positive externality of technological adoption.
Modularity of technologies and their complementarity are likely to be crucial ingredients
of successful recombination. This may involve the application of a new technology to a core
technology, or be the result of spillovers between different industries. Complementary
technologies usually recombine in a modular way, as is the case in microelectronics, where
different units are combined to form a new electronic instrument. Many examples of
recombinant innovation are found in the area of environmental technologies. The hybrid car
combines a conventional internal combustion engine with an electric propulsion system. In a
Combined Cycle Power Plant a gas turbine generates electricity while waste heat is used to
make steam to generate additional electricity via a steam turbine. Even more striking is the
integrated photovoltaic and gas-turbine system, where wasted heat is collected by
photovoltaic devices (Jaber et al., 2003). Further examples are power plants and vehicles
based on fuel cells: different types exist, which are based on alternative electrolytes (alkaline
solutions, polymer membranes, etc.); these allow for spillovers and recombination. Another
case is photovoltaic films, which combine solar cells and thin layer technologies. In general,
recombinant innovation creates links between industries that were previously far from each
other. One example combines the construction and solar technology industries, with so-called
Building-Integrated Photovoltaics: photovoltaic materials are used to replace conventional
building materials in parts of the building envelope such as the roof, skylights or facades.
We may conceptually widen the pool of competing recombinant options considering
that two technologies must not necessarily be substitutes to compete. Even if two
technologies show some degree of complementarity, capital and labour constraints mean a
choice is needed between developing the one or the other. Consequently, the two
technologies becomes substitutes in the investment decision of this firm. This is the case of
large corporations that are active in more than one industry. For example, Sanyo and Sharp,
which are traditionally active in consumer electronics, are now also developing and selling
renewable energy technologies, especially photovoltaic devices.
We propose a model of competing technologies that produces different scenarios of
technological evolution and related pollution levels. A “dirty” and a “clean” technology
compete in the market. Recombination of these technologies is possible, giving rise to a
technology with favourable environmental (clean) and economic (viable) characteristics.
This model allows us to address the issue of unlocking the economy from the undesirable
dirty technology. More generally, the need for more efficient systems of energy production
and consumption often calls for the combination of technologies that were previously
competing or unrelated. Relevant research questions are then if and how pollution dynamics
is affected by the increasing returns of technological adoption and by the expectation of
recombinant innovation, and how a government should intervene to guide the development
of environmentally clean technologies. This is where our model finds its main motivation.
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The optimal diversification of research portfolios has been studied by Dasgupta and
Maskin (1987) and, more recently, van den Bergh (2008) and Zeppini-Rossi and van den
Bergh (2008). The latter two works present analysis of the optimal investment in two
technologies when recombinant innovation is taken into account, assuming the probability of
recombination to be larger the more diversified the technological portfolio. One general
finding is that in an uncertain environment parallelism of investments should not be
considered as waste, unless increasing returns outweigh the benefits from diversification.
An investment in recombinant innovation represents an activity of exploratory research,
which typically involves uncertainty about whether a successful recombination will appear or
not.
Our model sets the recombinant innovation problem in a sequential investment decision
framework similar to Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992). This allows us to
address path-dependence and lock-in of technology investments. The basic idea is that at
each time t one firm sets its share of capital invested in the two competing technologies. This
firm thus decides whether to specialize or to diversify its technological portfolio, taking into
account increasing returns on investment and the probability of recombinant innovation.
Both depend on history, i.e. on previous decisions by other firms. The event of lock-in is
caused by the self-reinforcing mechanism of increasing returns. This mechanism is
counterbalanced by recombinant innovation, which can possibly trigger unlocking.
With our model we study the distribution of outcomes in terms of technology diffusion
and pollution levels. We distinguish between scenarios in which lock-in can be avoided or
not. By introducing a critical mass effect into the probability of recombinant innovation we
also show situations in which a convergence path leading to the dominance of one
technology may be reverted, so that lock-in may be escaped. We further analyse the
combined effect of an environmental policy and a hybrid technology solution, represented by
recombinant innovation. We find that the latter limits the pollution abatement if the
environmental policy is strong. However, if policy stringency cannot be high, recombinant
innovation represents a good compromise. This basic picture does not change when we also
consider policy costs.
In summary, the environmental dimension of our work includes four aspects: different
pollution intensities of two competing technologies; increasing returns to scale possibly
leading to lock-in of the dirty technology, which can be countered by recombinant innovation
resulting in a hybrid technology; environmental policy that affects selection of technologies;
the effects of a cost of such a policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and studies the model without
environmental policy. Section 3 extends the analysis with environmental policy with and
without costs. Throughout we employ numerical analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1 Competing Clean and Dirty Technologies
Arthur (1989) proposed a famous model of competing technologies to explain technological
path-dependence and lock-in. Here we extend his model in two ways. First, we introduce
pollution emission of competing technologies. Second, while there is no innovation in
Arthur’s model, we allow for recombinant innovation of the two competing technologies. The
Competing Recombinant Technologies for Environmental Innovation 319
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recombinant innovation never reaches the state where it enters the competition between
technologies. What we study here is how the expectation of its occurrence affects agents’
decisions and, in turn, technological dynamics.
Assume a large pool of firms that are asked, each one at a different time, to make a
decision about the allocation of capital to two available technologies. These happen to have
very different pollution emissions: technology c is relatively clean, while technology d is
relatively dirty. All firms are equal, and do not have heterogeneous intrinsic preferences for
one or the other technology. Time is discrete: in every period t one firm makes an investment
decision for the two available technologies. This is expressed by a share at, representing the
proportion of investment devoted to technology d. The rest goes to technology c. Investment
by each firm is normalized to 1. Specialization means either at ¼ 0 or at ¼ 1, while perfect
diversification is denoted by at ¼ 1/2.
Let nd,t and nc,t be the values at time t of the cumulative capital invested in technology d
and in technology c, respectively. For instance, if at time t a firm chooses to focus on
investing in technology d, nd,t increases by a unit, while nc,t stays unchanged. The general
formulation of cumulative investments is as follows:
nd ;t ¼ nd ;t21 þ at ;
nc;t ¼ nc;t21 þ 12 at : ð1Þ
The initial condition is w ¼ nd,0 þ nc,0. Then cumulative investments are nd,t þ nc,t ¼ w þ t.
This number grows linearly, while pollutive emissions at time t depend on the diffusion of the
two technologies. If ec and ed denote the pollution intensities of c and d, respectively, with
ed . ec, then the total pollution generated at time t is zt ¼ ednd,t þ ecnc,t. We look at two
indicators of pollution. The first is the cumulative emissions in [0,t ]:
It ;
Xt
j¼1
zj : ð2Þ
The second is the average pollution intensity:
z^t ;
zt
nd ;t þ nc;t ¼ ð12 x t Þed þ xtec : ð3Þ
Here xt ¼ nc,t /(nd,t þ nc,t) is the proportion of technology c. The proportion of the dirty
technology is then 1 2 xt. This is a state variable of our system: from xt we can compute z^t , zt
and It. Because of path-dependency, two paths of technological investments presenting
different values of z^t also have different values of It (i.e. paths never cross).
2.2 Recombinant Innovation
The dynamics of at is driven by the sequential decisions of firms. Firms are boundedly
rational and set at taking into account the value of technological shares in the previous
period. We consider two forces that determine the decision of a firm: the first is the positive
network externality of other firms’ decisions, as in Arthur’s model. The second is the
expectation that the two technologies may recombine in an innovative hybrid technology.
Recombinant innovation occurs with probability pt, which is larger the more diversified the
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cumulative investment. We formalize this probability as the balance of the cumulative
investment in the two technologies (Zeppini-Rossi and van den Bergh, 2008):
pt ¼ 4hðtÞ nc;t nd ;tðnc;t þ nd ;t Þ2
¼ 4hðtÞxt ð12 x t Þ: ð4Þ
Here h(t) [ [0,1] is a measure of the effectiveness of the recombination process, which
captures how easily the two technologies recombine.1 It is affected by general technological
progress, resulting in a learning curve of recombinant technology. We assume this is
increasing with a critical mass effect, which relates to the S-shaped path of technological
growth (Mansfield, 1961). To reflect this phenomena, we define the effectivenesshas follows:
hðtÞ ¼ e
1 þ exp ð2v ðt 2 t0ÞÞ : ð5Þ
The critical mass is represented by the flex point t0. The parameter v controls the speed of
technological advance. The critical mass t0 separates two different regimes: below t0 marginal
effects are increasing, while above t0 they are diminishing. This is a typical feature of
technological innovation, where a new idea or technique needs to acquire a minimal amount
of investment or recognition before taking off. After this critical mass is reached, further
improvements only add diminishing benefits to the innovation. The independent variable t has
a double interpretation: it represents time as well as investment, since in each period one unit
of capital is invested. Finally, the parameter e [ [0,1] is a static value of recombination
effectiveness, which may be seen as an indicator of how distant the two recombinant
technologies are in the technological space.
The decision problem is twofold: a firm must decide whether to specialize or to diversify;
and, in case specialization is preferred, which technology to choose (a or b). When facing
the investment decision the firm has to balance two forces, namely the probability pt and the
returns to adoption for each technology. The first means a force towards maximal diversity
or a ¼ 1/2, and the second towards specialization. In other words, firms decide based on the
following rule of thumb: if the probability of recombinant innovation is large, it is better to
diversify the investment. If it is low, it is better to go for specialization. The part of the
investment that is not equally allocated goes to technology a with probability q. All this is
expressed by the following rule:
at ¼ 1
2
pt21 þ gt ð12 pt21Þ; gt , binomialð0; 1; qÞ: ð6Þ
The random variable bt makes xt a stochastic process. If we “freeze” b, we have a
deterministic one-dimensional system: knowing xt is enough to compute pt, atþ1 and xtþ1.
Without recombination (e ¼ 0), at is either 0 or 1, and we have Arthur’s model.
1 The factor 4 normalizes the maximum value of this balance function to 1, which is attained when thetwo technologies
are equally represented (nd,t ¼ nc,t).
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2.3 Network Externalities
A self-reinforcing mechanism of increasing returns to investment describes the effect of
network externalities in technological decisions. Assume the probability q of the binomial
variable gt (Equation 6) is a function of the proportion of technological investments xt and, in
turn, of past realizations of at itself. Increasing returns to investments means that q is
increasing in xt. Formally, we set qt ¼ f(xt) with f(x) increasing. The variable f is called the
allocation function. A straightforward specification is f(x) ¼ x: whenever the dirty technology
is more diffused, xt , 1/2, we have qt , 1/2, which makes investment in the clean
technology less likely than in the dirty technology. A discrete choice process where the
probability of one option is equal to the actual proportion of that option is called a Polya
process. Arthur’s (1989) model relies on a generalization of such processes, called
generalized Polya processes, which were studied in more detail in Arthur et al. (1987). We
will refer to this model as the AEK model henceforth.
When we set f(x) ¼ x, the process always converges to a limit value, which is not known
a priori. Such a model is not suitable for technology dynamics, as it does not capture the
stylized fact of lock-in of a technology: the share xt needs to converge to an equilibrium
where one technology is dominant. This is achieved using an S-shaped increasing allocation
function, with three fixed points x1 , x2 , x3 such that x2 is unstable while x1 and x3 are
stable. For two equally good technologies without external intervention (environmental
policy), x2 ¼ 1/2, while x1 and x2 satisfy the symmetry condition f(x1) ¼ 1 2 f(x2).
2.4 Arthur’s Model Extended
The AEK model of Arthur et al. (1987) and Arthur (1989) can be extended with recombinant
innovation. We show that the resulting model coincides with our model in the sense of
having the same distribution of realizations of the state variable. In the AEK model the
equation of motion for the proportion x is as follows:
xtþ1 ¼ x t þ 1
w þ t ½aðxt Þ2 x t ; ð7Þ
where w is the initial number of investments and b is a random variable defined as
aðx Þ ¼
1 with probability qðx Þ;
0 with probability 12 qðx Þ:
(
ð8Þ
This binomial random variable accounts for the increments of technologies’ choices based
on a probability given by the allocation function q(x). The latter controls the type of feedback
produced by the proportion x. As before, we are interested in positive feedback, which
means an increasing function q. We adopt a binomial logit specification, which is a
customary assumption of discrete choice models (Hommes, 2006):2
qðx Þ ; exp ðbx Þ
exp ðbx Þ þ exp ðbð12 x ÞÞ ¼
1
1 þ exp ½bð12 2x Þ : ð9Þ
2 We also studied results for the sinusoidal allocation function q(x) ¼ 1/2{1 þ sin[p(x 2 1/2)]}, but prefer the logistic
one as it is more flexible in describing different conditions in terms of convergence of the decision process and possible
asymmetries of available options.
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This specification contains the implicit utility function u(xt) ¼ xt. The intensity of choice b . 0
reflects the rationality of firms in making a decision.3 Extreme cases are b ¼ 0 (each
technology is selected with equal probability, for any value of x) and b ¼ 1 (one technology
is selected with probability one, as soon as x . 1/2).
The left part of Figure 1 reports some examples of q(x): the larger b, the more the
allocation function resembles a step function, with stable fixed points approximated by 0 and
1. The right part of Figure 1 shows seven simulations of xt for b ¼ 8. Lock-in always occurs,
with equal probability for each technology.
The AEK model can be extended to include recombinant innovation, introducing the
expectation that available technologies recombine with a positive probability. To do this we
redefine the decision variable in Equation 8 with
aðx ; tÞ ¼
1 with probability ½12 pðx ; tÞqðx Þ;
1=2 with probability pðx ; tÞ;
0 with probability ½12 pðx ; tÞ½12 qðx Þ:
8><
>: ð10Þ
With probability 1 2 p (x ; t ) we still apply the Polya process mechanism equipped with an
allocation function q(x), and with probability p (x ; t ) we diversify and update technological
proportions with the balanced investment allocation expressed by ¼ 1/2.
Now we show that our model and the extended AEK model converge to the same
distribution. Substitute Equation 4 into Equation 6 and the result into Equation 1:
nc;tþ1 ¼ nc;t þ 2e nc;t nd ;tðnc;t þ nd ;t Þ2
þ btþ1 12 4e nc;t nd ;tðnc;t þ nd ;t Þ2
" #
: ð11Þ
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)
Figure 1. Left: examples of allocation function. Right: seven simulations of the AEK model with b ¼ 8.
3 Alternatively, if one thinks that firms decide based on some information about their environment, b is the inverse of
the variance of the noise that affects such information.
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This equation can be written in terms of the proportion of investments x t ¼ nc;t=ðnd ;t þ nc;t Þ,
x tþ1 ¼ xt w þ t
w þ t þ 1 þ
1
w þ t þ 1 ½2ext ð12 x t Þð12 2btþ1Þ þ btþ1
¼ xt w þ t
w þ t þ 1 þ
1
w þ t þ 1 ½atþ1 ¼ xt þ
1
w þ t þ 1 ðatþ1 2 xt Þ:
ð12Þ
This resembles Arthur’s process Equation 7. The main difference lies in the decision
variable at, which is Equation 6 in our model, and Equation 10 in the extended AEK model.
We show how the distributions of the two models coincide in the long run. The expected
value of Equation 12 is
Et ½x tþ1 ¼ x t þ 1
w þ t þ 1
1
2
pt þ qðx t Þð12 pt Þ2 xt
 
:
The expected value of Equation 7, with a given by Equation 10, is
Et ½xtþ1 ¼ xt þ 1
w þ t
1
2
pt þ qðxt Þð12 pt Þ2 x t
 
:
The two expected values coincide as soon as time t . .1. Then we can say that the two
model converge to the same distribution. For this reason, we will use the extended AEK
model henceforth and refer to it as the model of competing recombinant technologies.
2.5 Simulation of the Model
In order to apply our model to the environmental problem we set an unbalanced initial
condition, with the dirty technology d being more diffused than the clean technology c. By
simulating the model, we study the different scenarios produced bydifferent values of the
parameters. In this section we focus on the role of recombinant innovation, asking whether
this effect can reduce emissions without any environmental policy.
In what follows we set the following conditions: emission intensities ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1;
initial shares x0 ¼ 0.1; initial value of cumulative investment w ¼ 100. The allocation
function Equation 9 has b ¼ 8. The effectiveness of recombinant innovation in Equation 5
has speed v ¼ 10 and critical mass t0 ¼ 2,000. We run the model for T ¼ 10,000 periods.
Figure 2 shows seven simulation runs without recombinant innovation. The initial
advantage of the dirty technology is too big: the system converges to a complete dominance
of this technology, due to network externalities. Pollution increases and is set to a level
dictated by the dirty regime. A different picture arises if recombinant innovation is strong
(Figure 3).
With e ¼ 0.9 the clean technology initially loses ground, then it recovers when the
recombinant technology takes off. Accordingly, the pollution levels initially grow fast and
then go down when the critical mass of cumulative investments has been reached.
A stronger recombinant innovation increases the variability of the model. In Figure 3 different
simulations may differ strongly both in technology share and in pollution levels. In one case,
the clean technology only attains x ¼ 0.1 after 10,000 time periods, while in another case it
reaches a share larger than x ¼ 0.3.
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We study the distribution of a large number of simulations (1,000).
Figure 4 presents the histograms of final pollution levels z^T for three sets of simulations
with a different value of the recombination effectiveness: the stronger the recombinant
innovation, the lower the location of the distribution of pollution levels and the larger its
dispersion. Simulations with longer time horizons (T . 100,000) show that technology
shares converge to equal proportions when e is large enough. This suggests the existence
of a threshold level of recombination effectiveness, which is necessary to escape lock-in of
the dirty technology. This threshold depends on the initial condition x0 and on the shape of
the learning curve of h(t) (Equation 5), but it is independent of the pollution level, because
any feedback from this is missing without environmental policy. Although recombinant
0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000
0
0.01
0.02
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0.04
0.05
0.06
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0.08
0.09
0.1
t
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10
t
z/
(w
+t)
Figure 3. Seven simulations of the model with recombinant innovation e ¼ 0.9. Left: share of the clean technology.
Right: total pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 2. Seven simulations of the model without recombinant innovation. Left: share of the clean technology. Right:
total pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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innovation can unlock the system from the lock-in of the dirty technology, it cannot revert the
proportions and make the clean technology dominant: x ¼ 0 or x ¼ 0.5 are the only limit
values of the model.
3. Environmental Policy
3.1 Formulation of Policy
The model presented so far is symmetric in the two technologies, meaning that no
technology has an intrinsic advantage. Here we introduce an environmental policy that
explicitly favours the clean technology, breaking the symmetry of the model. One way of
modelling such a policy is by introducing a new feedback in the allocation function q(x) of the
increments in Equation 8. In the previous model, agents were deciding only under the
influence of the positive externality of other agents’ decisions, represented by the proportion
xt. We make the implicit utility u(xi,t) ¼ xi,t more general now by redefining it as
uðx i ;t Þ ¼ x i ;t 2 seix i ;t , where ei is the intensity of pollution emissions of technology i defined
earlier, and s is the pollution charge that represents the instrument of environmental policy.
According to this new definition the probability Equation 9 of choosing the clean technology c
becomes
qðx Þ ; exp ½bðx 2 secx Þ
exp ½bðx 2 secx Þ þ exp ½bð12 x 2 sed ð12 x ÞÞ ¼
1
1 þ exp ða 2 bx Þ ; ð13Þ
with a ¼ b(1 2 sed) and b ¼ b½22 sðed þ ec Þ. If s ¼ 0 (no policy) we are back to the
previous situation (Equation 9). If stringency is too large and sei . 1, the pollution externality
overcomes increasing returns for technology i. We first look at the combined effect of
recombinant innovation and policy on the distribution of the increments a with respect to the
proportion x. Figure 5 shows the plots of the expected value E ½aðx Þ ¼ ½12 pðx Þqðx Þ þ
0:5pðx Þ for six choices of (e,s) in the long run, where h(t) . e. Symmetry is lost whenever
s . 0.
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Figure 4. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 for M ¼ 1,000 simulation runs. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre:
e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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3.2 Simulation of the Model with Environmental Policy
In the following we simulate the model for different levels of policy stringency s and
recombination effectiveness e. As before, we assume the dirty technology has an emission
intensity which is 10 times larger than that of the clean technology (ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1), while
the clean technology is much less diffused, with a share x0 ¼ 10%. All of the other
parameters are set with the same value of the simulations without policy. Let us first consider
the case without recombinant innovation, evaluating the model for three different levels of
policy stringency.
In the case with s ¼ 0.05 (Figure 6) the system converges to the dominance of the dirty
technology, with a consequent increase of the pollution intensity. This indicates that such a
policy stringency is inadequate to mitigate pollution in the situation considered. A slightly
more stringent policy (s ¼ 0.06, Figure 7) may lead to very different outcomes: in some
cases the system remains locked in to the dirty technology, while in other cases the clean
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Figure 6. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0 and s ¼ 0.05. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 5. Plots of the expected value of investment E [a(x)], with and without recombinant innovation. Left: without
policy (s ¼ 0). Centre: with s ¼ 0.05. Right: with s ¼ 0.1.
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technology overcomes eventually the dirty one, with consequent large abatement of the total
pollution intensity. Such a high variability is testified also by the values of the cumulative
emissions in the seven simulations (the left part of Figure 7). With s ¼ 0.07 the system
always escapes lock-in, converging to the dominance of the clean technology (Figure 8).
These simulations show that an environmental policy can unlock the system from the dirty
technology. This happens if the negative externality from pollution weighs more in agents’
decisions than the initial network externality advantage of the dirty technology. The case
s ¼ 0.06 is one where the two forces are comparable. The final outcomes present a high
variability depending strongly on early decisions by agents. This mechanism explains the
path-dependency of the technology share dynamics (Arthur, 1989).
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Figure 7. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0 and s ¼ 0.06. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 8. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0 and s ¼ 0.07. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Recombinant innovation may or may not work in the same direction as environmental
policy. It helps to abate pollution when the policy is weak (Figure 9).
In the case of Figure 10 the abatement is even larger: recombinant innovation and
environmental policy work together in favour of the clean technology. If we compare this
case with the corresponding case without recombinant innovation (Figure 7) we see a trade-
off in the action of recombinant innovation: on the one hand, it limits the abatement of
pollution, excluding the possibility that the clean technology overcomes the dirty one; on the
other hand, it reduces strongly the variability of final outcomes. The negative effect of
recombinant innovation is more evident with a strong environmental policy (s ¼ 0.07, Figure
11): initially the clean technology outperforms the dirty one, thanks to the environmental
policy, but later it loses ground, due to the takeoff of recombinant innovation.
Now we study the distribution of many simulations of the model with environmental
policy. Figure 12 contains the result for s ¼ 0.05. The three different histograms indicate that
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Figure 9. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0.9 and s ¼ 0.05. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 10. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0.9 and s ¼ 0.06. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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recombinant innovation reduces pollution, with lower dispersion of final outcome the larger
its effectiveness.
With a stronger environmental policy we obtain the results in Figure 13. The variability is
lower with respect to a weaker policy. More importantly, recombinant innovation limits the
effect of a strong environmental policy in terms of abatement of pollution.
Figure 14 considers the effect of a different stringency s of environmental policy, for a
given effectiveness of recombinant innovation. The mean pollution level goes down when
the policy becomes more stringent, as expected. Regarding the standard deviation of final
outcomes, the effect of stringency is not univocal. Nevertheless, the cumulative pollution
emission over the period considered (T ¼ 10,000) is also much reduced with a more
stringent policy.
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Figure 11. Seven simulations of the model with e ¼ 0.9 and s ¼ 0.07. Left: share of the clean technology. Right: total
pollution intensity. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 12. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 for M ¼ 1,000 simulation runs. Environmental
policy has s ¼ 0.05. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre: e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10,
ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Summarizing the results, recombinant innovation helps to escape from the lock-in of the
dirty technology, notably if policy stringency is not too high. When recombinant innovation is
strong enough, the outcome is a 50/50 scenario, with limited abatement of pollution. This
means that recombinant innovation is harmful when the environmental policy is very
stringent. However, if the government cannot realize a stringent policy, then recombinant
innovation helps to reduce pollution and also makes the possible final outcome less
uncertain.
3.3 Cost of Environmental Policy
As a final extension of the model we include the cost of the environmental policy and study
how this affects technology diffusion and pollution. The cost of an environmental policy may
be modelled through a factor that lowers the growth rate, meaning that both investments in
clean and dirty technology have a lower return. Formally, we define a cost factor r [ [0,1]
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Figure 13. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 for M ¼ 1,000 simulation runs. Environmental
policy has s ¼ 0.07. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre: e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10,
ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 14. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 for M ¼ 1,000 simulation runs. Recombination
effectiveness is e ¼ 0.09. Left: s ¼ 0.05. Centre: s ¼ 0.06. Right: s ¼ 0.07. The parameters are x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100,
ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
Competing Recombinant Technologies for Environmental Innovation 331
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 01
:19
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
which enters the sequential decision equations in Equation 1 in the following way:
nd ;t ¼ nd ;t21 þ rat ;
nc;t ¼ nc;t21 þ r ð12 at Þ: ð14Þ
Consequently, the difference equation of the stochastic process xt for the share of clean
technology in Equation 7 becomes
x tþ1 ¼ xt þ 1
w þ t ½raðx t Þ2 xt : ð15Þ
One way to link the cost factor to the stringency of the environmental policy s is by defining
r ¼ 1/(1 þ s): the more stringent the policy, the higher the cost. Let us see how policy costs
affect the distribution of final outcomes of the model. We consider first a policy with
stringency s ¼ 0.05 (Figure 15).
If we compare the distributions of final pollution levels with the distributions obtained
without policy costs (Figure 12), the mean level is higher, especially when recombinant
innovation is present. The reason for this is that policy costs turn out to affect more strongly
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Figure 15. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 with environmental policy costs, for M ¼ 1,000
simulation runs. Environmental policy has s ¼ 0.05. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre: e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are
x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Figure 16. Distribution of total pollution level zˆT at time T ¼ 10,000 with environmental policy costs, for M ¼ 1,000
simulation runs. Environmental policy has s ¼ 0.06. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre: e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are
x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
332 P. Zeppini & J. C. J. M. van den Bergh
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [V
rije
 U
niv
ers
ite
it A
ms
ter
da
m]
 at
 01
:19
 18
 A
pri
l 2
01
2 
the investments in the clean technology. A stronger policy (s ¼ 0.06, Figure 16) increases
the variability of final outcomes, making the distribution very skewed.
This is more evident the less effective recombinant innovation is. With s ¼ 0.07
(Figure 17) the skewness of the emissions distribution is less pronounced than with
s ¼ 0.06. With respect to the model without policy costs, this time final emission levels are
more dispersed, but the mean level is not much higher. In fact, it is even lower when
recombinant innovation is strong (e ¼ 0.9). This means that policy costs affect the location
of the distribution less when the policy is more stringent.
These results show that policy costs do not change the main message: recombinant
innovation helps to abate pollution emissions if environmental policy is not too strong.
However, the effects of recombinant innovation are weakened by policy costs: when policy
is mild, recombinant innovation does not help much; when it is strong, it does not hurt much.
If policy costs are included then the results indicate that recombinant hybrid technologies are
still effective but less so in contributing to the abatement of pollution.
4. Conclusions
We have studied the decision problem of investments in a dirty and a clean technology,
when these are subject to increasing returns to investments and can recombine to produce a
hybrid technology. Agents can choose one or the other technology, or create a diversified
portfolio. We have constructed a model that extends the well-known Arthur (1989) model of
competing technologies in two ways: by adding (differential) pollution intensities of
competing technologies and by introducing the expectation of a hybrid technology due to
recombination of the two competing technologies.
The diversification incentive of a hybrid technology is opposed to the specialization
tendency due to the positive feedback of increasing returns that characterizes Arthur’s
model. If the effectiveness of recombinant innovation is large enough, lock-in of any
technology is prevented. If the effectiveness is too low, the dirty technology takes advantage
of its initial wider diffusion and ends up dominating the market. With a critical mass effect in
the recombinant innovation learning curve we obtain a reversal of the initial path towards
lock-in. The two technologies then converge to equal proportions after the reversal.
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Figure 17. Distribution of total pollution level z^T at time T ¼ 10,000 with environmental policy costs, for M ¼ 1,000
simulation runs. Environmental policy has s ¼ 0.07. Left: e ¼ 0. Centre: e ¼ 0.5. Right: e ¼ 0.9. The parameters are
x0 ¼ 0.1, w ¼ 100, ed ¼ 10, ec ¼ 1, b ¼ 8, v ¼ 10 and t0 ¼ 2,000.
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Recombinant innovation can thus provoke a regime shift in the technological path and
unlock the economy from an undesirable dominant dirty technology, to the advantage of the
clean technology.
In a second stage we have introduced environmental policy in the model in the form of a
pollution charge, which causes a negative feedback from pollution to investment choices.
The system becomes asymmetric given that different emission intensities enter the implicit
utility function of agents. Consequently, there are three forces interacting in the model,
namely increasing returns, recombinant innovation and environmental policy. We find that
recombinant innovation helps substantially to escape from lock-in of the dirty technology,
notably if the stringency of the environmental policy is low. On the other hand, if
environmental policy is stringent, recombinant innovation limits the abatement of pollution
(although it reduces the uncertainty of the outcome), as the system will not entirely move
away from the dirty technology. This limitation would lose relevance if the recombinant
hybrid alternative emerges and enters the technology competition (which falls outside our
model frame).
If we also consider the costs of the environmental policy, the role of recombinant
innovation becomes less important. Nevertheless, it remains effective in abating pollution. It
fosters investment in the clean technology through the intermediate advantage of a
diversified technological portfolio enhanced by a hybrid technology. Moreover, cumulative
pollution grows less fast.
To conclude, recombinant innovation resulting from highly diversified investments in
dirty and clean technologies can be seen as a second-best strategy to realize the
substitution of a dirty by a clean technology.
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